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Quine’s Meaning Nihilism: Revisiting Naturalism and Con-
firmation Method 
 
Sanjit Chakraborty 
 
 
Abstract: The paper concentrates on an appreciation of 
W.V. Quine’s thought on meaning and how it escalates 
beyond the meaning holism and confirmation holism, 
thereby paving the way for a ‘meaning nihilism’ and 
‘confirmation rejectionism’. My effort would be to see 
that how could the acceptance of radical naturalism in 
Quine’s theory of meaning escorts him to the indetermi-
nacy thesis of meaning. There is an interesting shift from 
epistemology to language as Quine considers that a per-
son who is aware of linguistic trick can be the master of 
referential language. Another important question is that 
how could Quine’s radical translation thesis reduce into 
semantic indeterminacy that is a consequence of his con-
firmation method. I think that the notion and the analysis 
of meaning became hopelessly vague in Quine’s later 
work. I further argue on Quine’s position of meaning that 
I call, following Hilary Putnam, ‘meaning nihilism’. It 
seems to me that Quine had no belief like ‘meaning con-
sists in’, or ‘meaning depends on’ something. Through 
this argument, I would like to challenge the confirmation 
holism that was foisted by Fodor on Quine’s thesis. My 
attempt would be to scrutinize Putnam’s point of view 
that Quine was neither a confirmation holist nor a mean-
ing holist. I think that both Putnam and Quine denied the 
concept of constitutive connection of meaning as a second 
grade notion not only from the realm of semantic, but also 
from the perspective of epistemology. So, linguistic 
meaning cannot be formed by any sample of its uses. For 
Quine, the concept of meaning in metaphysics is heuristic 
and need not be taken seriously in any ‘science worthy’ 
literature.  
 
Keywords: Quine, Meaning Holism, Meaning Nihilism, 
Naturalism, Putnam, Confirmation Method 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The most conspicuous part of Quine’s philosophy seems 
to me that his note on the theory of meaning has various 
dimensions. He tries to treat a theory of meaning, but his 
acceptance of the radical naturalism leads a unique turn 
that compels him to accept an indeterminacy principle 
and also the thesis of inscrutability of meaning and refer-
ence. Putnam writes: 
 
As for “meaning holism”, I have noticed something peculiar: I 
have noticed that whenever a passage from “Two Dogmas” is 
quoted to show that Quine is a “meaning holist”, the passage 
isn’t ever about meaning. What is cited are passages that display 
Quine’s “Duhemianism”, that is, the view that our bodies of sci-
entific theory confront “recalcitrant” experiences as wholes. 
This is a form of holism—calls it “evidential holism”, but it 
doesn’t concern meaning.1 
 
 
2. Naturalism and its consequences 
 
Quine, (I suppose) was the first philosopher who probably 
used the term “naturalism” from an empiricist point of 
view holding that science serves a standard paradigm for 
all knowledge. He considers the idea of ‘First Philosophy’ 
as an imprecise issue. In fact, for Quine, ‘naturalism’ is 
not a separate claim that can be regarded as a foundation 
of the sciences, but it is just like a proclamation about the 
truth that ‘science is all’ and something that aims to trans-
cend science become meaningless. Quine’s stance on sci-
ence and philosophy looks as if highly exclusive. He does 
not impose science upon philosophy and believes that 
without a standard base in natural science a philosophical 
method can’t be pertinent. Quine was initially influenced 
by empiricism and Vienna circle in his earlier age though 
later he has changed his mind. However, Lockean empiri-
cism taught him that one needs to deduce the truths of na-
ture from the sensory evidences and should define the 
truth in terms of the logico-mathematical auxiliaries and 
observation that can be confirming and also infirming it. 
Quine mainly follows the Tarskian model of truth. Here 
one may ask Quine that “When a people claims that 
‘snow is white’ is true just as well as I understand ‘snow 
is white’ is true, in this case what did he/she mean by 
using the term ‘understand’? Quine’s answer would be, 
the process of understanding a sentence depends on the 
conditions under which it is true. It does not construct any 
progress at all. Putnam believes, 
 
But Quine’s account of understanding does not use the notion of 
truth (which is how circularity avoided). To understand an ob-
servation sentence is to be conditioned in such a way that appro-
priate sensory stimulations will prompt one’s assent to the sen-
tence. And to understand a non-observational sentence is to 
master its role in the system...... Calling a sentence that someone 
(myself or someone else) utters (or thinks) “true” is just an indi-
cation that I would currently include that sentence in the system 
I use to predict.2      
 
 Quine is very much cautious about the fact that we 
cannot formulate all the statements of the world into the 
same boundary of verificationism. He was well aware 
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about the failure of radical empiricism which emphasizes 
that only immediate experiences can validate science. 
Here Quine’s purpose is to reorient ‘modern empiricism’ 
by challenging two tenets of empiricism. Quine writes, 
 
Two cardinal tenets of empiricism remainded unassailable, 
however, and so remain in this day. One is that whatever evi-
dence there is for science is sensory evidence. The other, to 
which I shall return, is that all inculcation of meaning of words 
must rest ultimately on sensory evidence.3  
 
 “What is the basic nature of natural science that Quine 
admitted?”, I did not find any exact answer from Quine’s 
writing. He has several ideas about the natural science 
and its outcomes in philosophy. Some of the prominent 
ideas are as follows: 
 First, He claims about an evidential checkpoint of sci-
ence like Wittgenstein, who once cited a quite similar 
thought in his ‘Language game’ hypothesis. Quine thinks, 
“A sentence’s claim to scientific status rests on what it 
contributes to a theory whose checkpoints are in predic-
tion.”4 
 Secondly, For Quine, the checkpoints must be ‘inter-
subjective’ that shows the evidential background of the 
third person perspective. 
 Thirdly, All the theoretical claims rest on the experi-
ments and observations.  
 Fourthly, Quine considers that the ‘web of belief’ 
should be in a ‘single language’ and also followed by the 
same logic. One can ask, ‘What is the utility of this 
view’? Gary Kemp clarifies Quine’s position from a dif-
ferent point. He writes, 
 
...all the evidence point to a single reality, not two or more, it 
ought to be possible to have a single theory describing it, where 
each part of it coheres with the rest on the score of explanation, 
where this in turn is a matter, in the best cases, of subsuming the 
explanda under maximally general quantified statements.5  
 
 We have already noticed that the naturalism is not just 
a rigorous science. Quine himself admits that from the 
impacts on sensory surfaces we can derive a theory of the 
external world with more or less successful prediction. 
For testing a theory the predictions become the pointers or 
evidential checkpoints. Observation is considered as an 
evidence of a theory that has two notable features, one is 
‘inter-subjectivity’ and the other is called ‘correspond-
ence to stimulation’. Quine thinks that an observation sen-
tence, like ‘it is raining’ or “that’s a cow” are based on the 
occasional sentences. Here the observation sentences of 
the speakers would be true or false on the basis of occa-
sion sensitivity. The conception of ‘inter-subjectivity’ re-
fers to the thesis that evidence must be public. In addition, 
the observation sentences are holophrastic ones, i.e. they 
could be formed out of any conjunction. It seems to me 
that one can link between an observation and a theory 
through a prediction. To clarify the important features of 
observation sentences, Quine thinks, 
 
The observation sentence is the means of verbalizing the predic-
tion that checks a theory. The requirement that it command a 
verdict outright is what makes it a final checkpoint. The re-
quirement of inter-subjectivity is what makes science objective.6  
 He also believes that the observation sentences are 
considered as a vehicle of our scientific evidences as well 
as also an entering wedge of language. There is a sort of 
naturalistic perspective engaged on the issues of language 
as a social art in Quine’s writings. It sounds to me very 
unique. Here one can ask whether the observation senten-
ces are theory laden. Actually observation sentences have 
two roots – language and science and it fits with these two 
ways excellently. Another relevant question is “how 
could an observation sentence be relative to the linguistic 
community?” Quine holds that the observation sentences 
are that on which the members of the community agreed 
outright on witnessing the occasion. In a word the obser-
vation sentences are not theory laden. An observation sen-
tence in Quinean sense is associated with the stimulation 
to an extent. Even words in an observation sentence may 
recur in other sentences on the basis of some theoretical 
contexts. This is the link that is also a relevant part of any 
scientific theory. But Quine writes, 
 
Seen holophrastically, as conditioned to stimulatory situations, 
the sentence is theory free; seen analytically, word by word, it is 
theory laden. Insofar as observation sentences bear on science at 
all, affording evidence and tests, there has to be this retrospec-
tive theory lading along with the pristine holophrastic freedom 
from theory.7  
 
 It is undoubtedly true that for Quine the conception of 
‘theory laded’ or ‘not theory laden’ do not play any sig-
nificant role in the case of observation sentences, the rea-
son is that there is no fact of the matter as to what it 
means. If we accept a translation manual then we should 
somehow admit that the words in an observation sentence 
contained ‘theoretical terms’.  
 Quine’s naturalistic epistemology is inseparable from 
his naturalistic conception of language. Natural science 
can be regarded as a building stone in Quine’s philoso-
phy. But it is startling that he does not deny the relevance 
of the conceptual analysis of common sense that is also 
based on experience or evidences, though these are slip-
shod, piecemeal, and comparatively unsystematic ways of 
knowledge. Quine argues, 
 
Science is not a substitutive for common sense but an extension 
of it. The quest for knowledge is properly an effort simply to 
broaden and deepen the knowledge which the man in the street 
already enjoys...8  
 
 Actually, Quine tries to give a naturalistic account of 
knowledge that outpaces knowledge of knowledge. It is 
not only concerned about the mere justification of know-
ledge, but also gives importance to its explanation, 
whereas the traditional epistemology is concerned about 
‘skepticism’ and tries to find out the ‘certainty of know-
ledge’ in general. Epistemological inquires have two di-
mensions. The first side is called by Quine the ‘concep-
tual side’ and the second side is called the ‘doctrinal side’. 
The ‘conceptual side’ of traditional epistemology defines 
the various concepts of phenomenal knowledge. In addi-
tion, the ‘doctrinal side’ copes with the justifications that 
confirm those concepts raised in the ‘conceptual side’ of 
epistemology. The ‘conceptual side’ is more close to the 
theory of meaning whereas, the ‘doctrinal side’ is close to 
the theory of truth and reference too. In the beginning part 
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of the paper “Epistemology Naturalized”, Quine writes 
that epistemology is worried about the foundations of the 
sciences. Even he is not happy to accept the Cartesian 
quest for certainty and suggests that it is a sort of ‘lost 
cause’.  But Kim shows, 
 
In urging naturalized epistemology on us, Quine is not suggest-
ing that we give up the Cartesian foundationlist solution and ex-
plore others within the same framework-perhaps to adopt some 
sort of ‘coherenist’ strategy, or to require of our basic beliefs 
only some degree of  ‘initial credibility’ rather than Cartesian 
certainty...Quine’s proposal is more radical than that. He is ask-
ing us to set aside the entire framework of justification-centered 
epistemology. That is what is new in Quine’s proposals. Quine 
is asking us to put in its place a purely descriptive causal-
nomological science of human cognition.9  
 
 Kim furthermore suggests that Quine’s epistemology 
chiefly focuses on the vital question ‘how does evidence 
relate to reality?’ This kind of empiricist account tries to 
explain the world from the outlook of naturalism but the 
fact is that our interpretation of the world is expressed by 
the set of sentences and words. Here the part of language 
is to mingle with naturalized epistemology. I think that 
though it is true that Quine is interested in the eventual 
acquisition of the scientific knowledge, yet language as a 
vehicle of knowledge takes a crucial position in his regi-
mented naturalistic theory. Here we find a shift from talk-
ing of reference to talking about words. Quine calls this 
shift as a ‘semantic ascent’. Quine believes that a person 
who is aware of the linguistic tricks can be a master of 
referential language. He in no way denies the disposi-
tional use of reference fixation. Language of reference 
becomes suitable when an agent says ‘my cat’ is to refer 
to his/her own cat. Here the relation between language 
and the world depends on the observational sentences and 
the reference is just a capacity that is bonded with certain 
linguistic apparatus (which is complex) that is also con-
joined with observation sentences.  
 
 
3. Indeterminacy of Translation 
 
 We know that through the limited words, we can con-
strue unlimited sentences. Therefore, we should have a 
comprehensive grasp of the meaning of the words in gen-
eral. Quine thinks that, except these kind of situations, 
actually the words get their meaning in terms of the sen-
tences. He writes, 
 
We learn short sentences as wholes, we learn their component 
words from their use in those sentences, and we build further 
sentences from words thus learned.10  
 
 From this discussion Quine mainly indicates two 
points that are worth mentioning here: 
a) The notion of meaning is inextricably related to 
the sentences that together constitute language as a 
social art. This is called by Quine ‘holistic stand-
point’, a very controversial issue that I will elabo-
rately discuss later. 
b) The meaning of a sentence is not independent. The 
sentential meaning of one language can be derived 
when we translate it into another language. Quine 
calls this startling argument as “radical translation” 
that also indicates the translation of object lan-
guage that does not depend on any type of pre-
existing aids. One can set up more than one set of 
translation manuals for an object language that 
leads to accept a thesis of indeterminacy of transla-
tion. 
 Quine admits that the ‘indeterminacy of translation’ 
thesis is a consequence of his behaviourism that is manda-
tory for linguistic. He argues, 
 
In psychology one may or may not be a behaviourist, but in lin-
guistics one has no choice. Each of us learns his language by 
observing other people’s verbal behaviour and having his own 
faltering verbal behaviour observed and reinforced of corrected 
by others.11  
 
 In Quine’s thought, an experiment (indeterminacy of 
translation) of the source language comes from the jungle. 
It is obviously a sort of jargon and here the “target lan-
guage” of the translator is not other than English. In such 
a situation, where language becomes inaccessible, there 
we can receive the data by observing native’s utterances 
and behaviours. The communicating process that is de-
pendent on the queries (expedient) of assent or dissent 
sounds purely a conjectural and observational science. 
The case of attempt to translate a native language and the 
fact assent and dissent can be considered as the modes of 
rudimentary linguistic behavior. I will discuss on this as-
pect in detail later.  
 Quine’s ‘indeterminacy of translation’ thesis that is 
perhaps best discussed in his well-known book Word and 
Object can be regarded as a thought experiment. Quine 
believes that it is easy to find out a resemblance between 
two kindred languages like, French and English as in the 
case of their translation, we find a kind of similarity of 
their cognate word forms. Even translation equations have 
also been possible between two unrelated languages like 
English and Hungarian because of their shared culture 
and beliefs. But Quine is vexed about the translation 
manual where there is no such cultural similarity or simi-
larity in their cognate word forms. Putnam suggests, 
 
A point which many critics missed is that Quine was arguing at 
least as much for the determinacy of translation in the case of 
observation sentences as for indeterminacy. True, Quine wants 
us to see that the use of a sentence need not fix its exact transla-
tion into another language, or even determinate what objects the 
sentence is about.12   
 
 Let us imagine a linguist who visits a jungle, where 
the native language is totally different from his/her own 
language (English) and there is no pre-existing aids of 
translation. Let us also imagine that a rabbit is passing by 
a field and a native suddenly utters the word 'gavagai'. 
Just by hearing the word 'gavagai' and seeing that a rabbit 
scurrying by, a linguist can note down the sentence ‘rab-
bit’ as a tentative translation of the native word 'gavagai'. 
But this is doubtlessly a kind of rough approximation. 
The linguist cannot ask to the native speaker what he 
means by using the word ‘gavagai’. Is it a ‘rabbit’ or a 
‘rabbit passing by’ or is it something else? Their inter-
communication is impossible as they individually pos-
QUINE’S MEANING NIHILISM 
 225 
sessed a different vocabulary for their communication. 
Quine writes, 
 
Only by taking the initiative and querying combinations of na-
tive’s sentence and stimulus situations so as to narrow down his 
guesses to his eventual satisfaction...... what he must do is guess 
from  observation and then see how well his guess work.13  
 
 Here one must see the expressions of assent and dis-
sent of a native speaker that will help us to predict the 
speech disposition of the native speakers. Next time when 
a linguist notices that by catching an animal into a cage, 
the native utters the same term ‘gavagai’, then he can pre-
dict from this situation that ‘gavagai’ cannot mean a rab-
bit is scurrying by or that ‘gavagai’ means the same as 
‘rabbit’. Here, in terms of the stimulus conditions a lin-
guist or a translator can share or translate the speaker’s 
utterances (a process of assent and dissent). Quine in his 
early writing claims that there is a sameness of stimulus 
meaning that we find between speakers, but in his later 
work he modifies his thought on stimulus meaning and 
says ‘If querying the sentence elicits assent from the 
given speaker on one occasion, it will elicit assent like-
wise on any other occasion when the same total set of re-
ceptors is triggered; and similarity for dissent.’14  
 Quine tries to accept the concept of single speaker re-
garding the sameness of stimulus meaning. But he does 
not try to avoid the jargon of “inter-subjective sameness 
of stimulus meaning” in his naturalism. “Inter-subjective 
sameness of stimulus meaning” applies only to the obser-
vational sentences that demonstrate the evidences, which 
should be accessible to the third person perspective. 
Quine strives to avoid the jargons of the studies of trans-
lations. Later Quine believes that if each members of a 
community observes a sentence, then spontaneously this 
sentence becomes an observation sentence for the whole 
community, while Davidson argues that “intersubjective 
likeness of stimulation”15 is possible only if we accept the 
stimulus to be not just as a bodily surface but as a share 
situation or ‘a shared cause of the pertinent’ behaviour of 
the two subjects. But Quine does not support Davidson’s 
view as his ‘naturalized epistemology’ taught him to find 
out evidences. Quine says, 
 
My naturalism does allow me free reference to nerve endings, 
rabbits, and other physical objects, but my epistemology permits 
the subject no such starting point.16  
 
 Quine accepts both the stimulus meaning and private 
stimulus meaning at the subject’s surface in his philoso-
phy. My point is that the stimulus meaning strictly de-
pends on the individual speaker, for example, ‘rabbit’, 
and this observational sentence is the sort of  “stimulus 
meaning”  for the field linguists whereas ‘gavagai’ has its 
stimulus meaning for the natives. We find that the con-
cept of ‘inter-subjective liken’ also make a challenge to 
the possibility of communication.  One can think it as a 
direction to the thesis of indeterminacy of translation. A 
linguist observes the assent of the term ‘gavagai’ by the 
natives when he looks that a ‘rabbit’ is passing by the 
field. Later, he tries to assign his stimulus meaning ‘rab-
bit’ to native’s stimulus meaning ‘gavagai’. Quine con-
siders, 
Empathy dominates the learning of language, both by child and 
by field linguist..... In the field linguists case it is empathy on his 
own part when he makes his first conjecture about ‘gavagai’ on 
the strength of the native’s utterance and orientation, and again 
he quarries ‘gavagai’ for the native’s assent in a promising sub-
sequent situation.17  
 
 Quine thinks that ‘radical translation’ is a continuous 
process of use. He is mainly revisiting the translation 
manual that lights agent’s success or failure of communi-
cation with the native language. In the field situation, 
where a radical translator does not follow the native’s 
speech, there the translator tries to extract meaning from 
the native’s behaviour. Even the native’s behaviour is 
amenable to the various translation manuals. In this case, 
meaning loses its actual uniqueness and this kind of 
speech disposition leads to an indeterminacy thesis as the 
same expressions of the natives can express different 
things in different situations. Quine claims,  
 
Their manual might be distinguishable in terms of any native 
behaviour that they give reason to expect, and yet each manual 
might prescribe some translation that the other translator would 
reject. Such is the thesis of indeterminacy of translation.’18  
 
 This kind of indeterminacy of translation not only oc-
curs in the field situation (native’s speech) but it can be 
applied in our ordinary language. There is a very import-
ant point where Quine indicates that, except some con-
trary evidences; actually the linguist takes a native’s ways 
of beliefs or thoughts to be similar to his beliefs or 
thoughts. The translator even tries to impose his/her own 
linguistic patterns on the natives to find out the compati-
bility of their behaviors and speeches, which also shows a 
similarity between the linguist’s own attitudes or speeches 
with the native’s attitudes or speeches. This doctrine is 
known as ‘principle of charity’. Quine thinks that in the 
case of indeterminacy thesis a linguist or translator should 
find out similarities in more cases between his stimulus 
meanings with natives stimulus meaning. So in the lo-
cation of the jungle, there are many chances to be misled 
because of the indeterminacy of the translation that leads 
some time to the striking simplification of referential di-
rectness. Quine clarifies his thoughts to suggest, 
 
It is the unsurprising reflection that divergent interpretations of 
the words in a sentence can so offset one another as to sustain 
and identical translation of the sentence as a whole. It is what I 
have called inscrutability of reference; ‘indeterminacy of refer-
ence’ would have been better.19  
 
 In his book Pursuit of Truth, Quine for the first time 
clarifies his very long controversial and obscure thought 
regarding ‘Ontological relativity’. Quine says, 
 
It is relative to a manual of translation. To say that ‘gavagai’ 
denotes ‘rabbit’ is to opt for a manual of translation in which 
‘gavagai’ is translated as ‘rabbit’, instead of opting for any of 
the alternative manuals.20 
 
 In the case of ‘word for word’ translation we need to 
see how much the sentences lead the speaker to believe in 
the concept of universal. But this would be unfeasible in 
the case of non-observational sentence as things become 
here much more indeterminate because of the lack of the 
SANJIT CHAKRABORTY 
 226 
sharing reference. If we construct the world predicting 
from the realm of sensation, then it would be obscure for 
us to posit some non-empirical entities like, idea or mean-
ing in our systems. The sameness of meaning depends on 
the role of similarity of the sentences play in two different 
languages. We cannot deny the usefulness of sameness of 
meaning in our ordinary language, but the first class sci-
entific theory does not bother about it. Hilary Putnam tells 
us a story about his experience when he delivered a talk in 
a Chinese university (Fudan University) in 1984. He says 
that in Chinese language there is no special suffix that can 
distinguish ‘mo’ (cat) from ‘mohood’ (cathood). ‘Cat 
here’ and ‘Cathood there’ are similar in the ordinary Chi-
nese language use. But Quine does not give importance to 
this question. Quine thinks that the conceptual scheme of 
the English people and the Chinese people work on the 
‘observational categories’ but the sentences they (Chi-
nese) express are not exactly isomorphic compared to our 
sentences.  The ‘parochial ontology’ of the English lan-
guage that talks about particulars and universals can be 
expressed in Chinese sentences in more than one way as 
we found in Putnam’s example. Here we will find the 
ambiguities in the case of using the different words. Ana-
lytic philosophy that gives more importance on the notion 
of meaning is tremendously refuted by Quine to suggest 
that the ‘notion of meaning’ and the ‘analysis of meaning’ 
are hopelessly vague. 
        
 
4. Critical Analysis 
 
Rosa and Lepore in their joint paper “Quine’s Holism”21 
argue in favour of a new thesis of “confirmation holism” 
regarding Quine’s position on meaning. Is Quine a mean-
ing holist? This is a very controversial question. I will 
thrash out my own observation later. Here, let me see first 
that how could the two philosophers Rosa and Lepore at-
tempt to establish their claims. For them, Quine’s mean-
ing holism can derive from his other associated thesis that 
is called ‘confirmation holism’ and ‘verificationism’. 
‘Confirmation holism’ subsumes the thought that no em-
pirical content can exist in isolation. We can identify an 
empirical content only through the theory as a whole. The 
possibility of knowing a hypothesis does not merely de-
pend on knowing the evidence and counter-evidence in 
the case of observation. They justify their words by quot-
ing Quine’s dictum that ‘The meaning of a statement is 
the method of empirically confirming or infirming it.’22 
For Quine to know the meaning of a sentence is to recog-
nize its evidence. Even Quine also believes, 
 
To learn a language is to learn the meaning of its sentences, and 
hence to learn what observations to count as evidence for and 
against them. The evidence relation and the semantical relation 
of observation to theory are co-extensive.23  
 
 Depending on the mentioned points, Rosa and Lepore 
articulate Quine’s thesis on ‘Meaning Holism’ as follows: 
 Premise 1. Meaning of a sentence consists in its con-
firmation evidences. This is called verificationism about 
meaning. We can call it a scientific practice argument. 
The general form of this hypothesis is that the truth value 
of the auxiliary assumption is based on the observational 
evidences in a certain condition where it will be true. If in 
any situation, it turns out as  false, then the scientists do 
not refute the whole theory/hypothesis, rather they refute 
the antecedent of the observational categories.    
 Premise 2. A scientific theory cannot confirm its evi-
dence or experiences individually, but it works only as a 
corporate body. This is called Duhem’s thesis. This 
theory tells that the observational sentences are mingled 
with the theoretical sentences and construct a whole scen-
ario where the meaning of a particular sentence is related 
to a unit of other sentences. If any case one of our lin-
guistic prediction turns out as false, then we should revise 
the sentence to avoid the false prediction.   
 Conclusion. The sentence of a language do not have 
meaning individually or in isolation, but as a corporate 
body or whole it depends on the other sentences of the 
language. This is a kind of meaning holistic approach.  
 Another very important point close to ‘meaning ho-
lism’ is Quine’s thesis on natural science. For this reason, 
Quine claims, 
 
With Dewey I hold that knowledge, mind and meaning are part 
of the same world that they have to do with, and that they have 
to study in the same empirical spirit that animates natural sci-
ence.24  
 
 Quine investigates the meaning as a social art of lan-
guage that has the public recognizable circumstances. 
Even his framework of meaning can be emphasized as a 
property of behaviour. Behaviour as a public evidence can 
verify ‘meaning holism’ from the context of indetermi-
nacy of translation. We find in Quine’s Word and Object 
that the conception of stimulus meaning cannot determine 
the various stages of ‘rabbit’ and ‘rabbit’ to as a transla-
tion of ‘gavagai’. Rosa and Lepore suggest, 
 
The moral of radical translation is then that meanings are not 
language-transcendent entities (propositions, mental or platonic 
entities); on the contrary, to understand a sentence is to under-
stand a language and the meaning of a sentence is determined by 
the meaning of the other sentences in the language.25  
 
 In the case of radical translation, Quine holds that the 
dichotomy between analytic truth and synthetic truth lead 
to a confusion regarding the picture of how language links 
to the world. Because, we know that the analytic truth 
takes care of language (especially on synonymy) whereas 
the synthetic truth reports on the world (informative). 
Language has no piecemeal relation to the world but the 
sentences are connected to the world in terms of the rela-
tion to other sentences. 
 Now the most important question is that “Is Quine a 
strong or moderate holist?” Before considering Quine as 
strong or moderate holist, we should first define the con-
cept of strong or moderate holism separately and after-
wards we need to focus what will be the suitable area for 
Quine’s thesis. Actually ‘strong holism’ emphasizes that 
the meaning of any sentence of the language is deter-
mined by its (evidential or inferential) relation to the other 
sentences; here the unit of meaning is the whole language.  
Rosa and Lepore say, 
 
That is, there are no statements whose truth values remain un-
touched by revision made in response to contrary experiences 
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(namely, there are no analytic statements). These two claims 
required that no sentence has meaning in isolation from every 
other of the language.26  
 
 Rosa and Lepore try to defend this type of strong ho-
lism. 
 Besides, ‘moderate holism’ considers that the meaning 
of any sentence of a language consists in its evidential re-
lation to many other sentences and the units of meaning 
are regarded as the fragment of the language. In “Two 
Dogmas of Empiricism”, we find that Quine tries to refute 
the conventional distinction between the analytic and the 
synthetic statements. As we are aware that in an analytic 
statement the predicate term is contained in the subject 
term. So the analytic sentences become true in virtue of 
the meaning of the component words. Here the relation of 
the world does not take any relevant role. So he refutes to 
accept the analytic statement to consider that the meaning 
of any sentence of a language is determined by its (obser-
vational/evidential) relation to every other sentence. 
Quine holds, ‘Our statements about the external world 
face the tribunal of sense experience not individually but 
only as a corporate body.’27 This turn can be recognized 
as a strong holistic framework. But in Quine’s later writ-
ing like Word and Object (1960), and “Epistemology 
Naturalized” (1969), we can find that his strong holistic 
framework becomes quite fixable. One can ask whether 
later Quine moves toward ‘moderate holism’ by thinking 
that the observational sentences do not have any intercon-
nectedness of sentences as they independently carried the 
stimulus meaning of the rest of the language. Even the 
essential process of language learning and the observa-
tional sentences are based on ‘the repository of evidence 
for scientific hypotheses’. Quine rightly points out, 
 
In this matter of understanding language, there is thus a subtle 
interplay between word and sentence. In one way the sentence is 
fundamental: understanding a word consist in knowing how to 
use it in sentences and how to react to such sentences. Yet if we 
would test some one’s understanding of a sentence, we do best 
to focus on a word, ringing changes on its sentential contexts.28   
 
 It’s very fascinating that Putnam challenges the prem-
ises raised by Rosa and Lepore and also once supported 
by Jerry Fodor. Putnam does not believe that Quine had a 
belief that a) Meaning consists in its empirical content or 
b) Meaning of a sentence is dependent on the corporate 
body of sentences. Putnam considers, 
 
I don’t believe Quine ever said anything like a) or b). His posi-
tion was that the notion of “meaning” is too unclear to be usable 
in serious science and philosophy. He had no position of the 
form “Meaning consists in X” and no position of the form 
“Meaning of a sentence depends on X”. To ascribe positions like 
that to him is to totally misunderstand Word and Object. He did 
regard “stimulus meaning” as a science worthy notion, and per-
haps empirical content (identified with an observation-
conditions implied by a theory) but “stimulus meaning” is not 
supposed be meaning and ‘empirical content’ is not supposed to 
be meaning either, which (“meaning”) is at best a notion of 
“heuristic” value; needed for practical purposes, but to be dis-
carded when our interests are theoretical.29  
 
 Some philosophers think that Quine takes his ‘mean-
ing holism’ depending on associating meaning with con-
firmation, and since confirmation for him includes (in 
fact, consists in) empirical confirmation, so his ‘meaning 
holism’ is incompatible with the notion of a priori. But 
just holding that the meaning of every term or sentences 
is constitutively connected with the meanings or uses with 
all other sentences or terms don’t in itself state an epi-
stemic position. I think that ‘meaning holism” in either 
Quinean form or the more general form just stated is in-
compatible with analyticity, unless one holds that all sen-
tences are analytic (something Leibniz did hold). If the 
meaning of every sentence depends on connections to the 
meanings of all other sentences, and some of the other 
sentences have meanings that become true relying on the 
connection to the world, then it looks that all sentences 
have meanings turn true in virtue of at least indirect rela-
tions to the world. I agree with Putnam that there is no 
property of (some) sentences can assure that a sentence 
will never need to be revised, or in other words, there is 
no usable notion of a priority, unless you speak of “a pri-
ority relative to a framework of ideas”. Putnam seems 
right on the claim that Fodor and Lepore have foisted 
Quine as a semantic holist. Putnam also considers like 
Quine that “meanings” aren’t objects. The dictionary 
meaning of a word can give us information, but that in-
formation does not determine the truth-evaluable content 
of a sentence in a context.  He accepts that what sentences 
are used to mean always depends on connections to the 
world, even in the case of logical or analytic sentences the 
same rules have been followed. But that is not because of 
some supposed grand theses of “meaning holism”, but 
because of the collapse of the unrelativized a priori.  
 It is quite true that in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” 
Quine tries to reject the mentalist theory of meaning by 
denying the traditional analytic-synthetic distinction. The 
first dogma as Quine puts it is the cleavage between the 
analytic propositions that are grounded independently of 
matters of fact and the synthetic propositions that are 
grounded only on facts or empirical contents. Critics con-
sider that this rejection of mentalist theory vindicates the 
thesis of externalism which paves the way for semantic 
holism. Here one thing is significant to mention that the 
heart of semantic holism is that the meaning of a sentence 
is defined in favors of the totality of nodes and paths in its 
semantic networks. Another important point, I assume 
that can help to show how meaning holism can compati-
ble with externalism is as follow. Meaning holism de-
pends on semantic externalism hypothesis. It is an accept-
able fact that we can have holistic externalist semantics 
and also non-holistic externalist semantics. Let us try to 
understand what I mean by holistic externalist semantics. 
It particularly means two things- 
 First, meanings are not in the head (Externalism) and 
secondly, meanings of linguistic units depend upon the 
meaning of the entire language (Holism). Let us take a 
simple example of the determination of the meaning of a 
predicate. Suppose we have a sentence which uses a natu-
ral kind term in its predicate, viz. the sentence “Jimmy is 
a tiger”. In order to understand the sentence we have to 
know which particular thing denotes by the name 
“Jimmy” and which property or bundle of properties are 
denoted by the predicate “is a tiger”. Further, we need to 
know if ‘Jimmy’ is indeed an instance of those properties. 
But this we need to know only if we are interested in de-
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termining the truth of the sentence. How do we decide 
which properties will be denoted by the predicate. Here 
we shall have to depend upon the socio-linguistic prac-
tices of the community in which this sentence is uttered. 
We are looking at the socio-linguistic practices of a com-
munity and so the meaning can not be located “in the 
head” of the speakers. However, the meaning of a single 
predicate rest on the entire socio-linguistic practices that 
are related to the entire language. This hypothesis il-
lustrates the ground of sematic holism. In this way, I 
would like to show how a holistic externalist semantic 
theory can work.  
 But my further query is ‘Does the contribution of the 
theoretical sentences depend on the contribution of the 
other sentences or not?’ It seems to me that if a sentence 
can causally be related (not inferentially) to the other sen-
tences or social characters of meanings, then we can 
understand the meaning of the sentence or words. The 
problem is that when a person know a sentence, then is it 
not possible for him/her to know the entire meaning of the 
sentence at a time. Though I agree with Quine that our 
statements face the tribunal of sense experiences only as a 
corporate body, yet it seems to me that it is quite impos-
sible for a learner to grasp the total related body of the 
sentences. Here, a learner tries to grasp the sentences 
which are much more relevant to know the expression 
(that she/he wants to know) but not the whole scheme. It 
is a reliable process of a speaker to know partially the 
knowledge of the meaning of an expression and later the 
learning process of the knowledge can be gradually in-
creased. 
 The philosophers who quoted a passage from “Two 
Dogmas of Empiricism” to prove that Quine accepted 
‘meaning holism’ has committed a mistake as Quine’s 
thesis never talks about the meaning here. So it would be 
an injustice for us to call him ‘meaning holist’ that paves 
the way for externalism. Quine supported Duhem’s scien-
tific theory of “evidential holism” that gives importance 
on the bodies of the scientific theory that confront on 
some recalcitrant experiences as a whole. No one can 
claim that Duhem was a meaning holist as he was less 
bothered about the fact of meaning.  Some philosophers 
like Dummett called Quine ‘moderate holist’ as in his phi-
losophy, we find a relation between theory and evidence. 
He like a positivist believes that empirical statements can 
be verified. But I agree with Putnam that Quine was not a 
verificationist in the Positivists sense. Fodor and Lepore 
called him verificationist in a holistic sense where the 
whole theory is presented to experience for validation. 
They think that the confirmation of an empirical theory 
doesn’t only depend on its relation, but also related to the 
other factors like availability of alternative theories, sim-
plicity or plausibility etc. that is Quine’s holism. They be-
lieve that “Quine-Duhem” thesis is the standard proof of 
their claim. Fodor made a great mistake to consider “veri-
fication” and “confirmation” as synonyms from an ordi-
nary sense that Quine did not. I think that Quine is not a 
‘confirmation holist’, he is a confirmation rejectionist. For 
Quine, the body of theory can confirm some of our beliefs 
in a good sense, but it does not follow that the body of the 
theory itself is confirmed by our observation. The reason 
is that Quine does not believe in the ‘science-worthy’ 
conception of confirmation. Quine does not accept mean-
ing as a ‘science-worthy’ notion, rather it is a second 
grade notion. So, it would be a mistake to call him a 
‘meaning holist’ as he was a ‘meaning nihilist’. 
 We know that in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” Quine 
tries to refute the claim that the theory of verification and 
confirming and disconfirming is relevant for language. He 
shows that the method of verification of an individual 
sentence is impossible. In Word and Object Quine claims 
that without the positing of meaning, our communication 
procedure can be well granted. Actually, he gives import-
ance on the verbal behavior that is rooted from Skinner. 
For Quine, the notion of analyticity and the notion of veri-
fiability are both in troubles. In “Two Dogmas of Empiri-
cism”, we will find that he does not talk about any ac-
ceptable conditions (identity) for meaning. But in Word 
and Object, Quine emphasizes on ‘science-worthy’ terms 
“stimulus meaning” and “translation manual” just to ex-
plain that the communication (speaking and translation) 
may be possible without accepting meaning as an entity. 
There is no ‘meaning’ in a single utterance or as a whole 
according to Quine. 
 It’s true that semantic holism depends on the associat-
ing meaning with confirmation, and since confirmation 
consists in the empirical confirmation, therefore semantic 
holism is incompatible with a priority. But just holding 
that the meaning of every term is constitutively collected 
with the meaning of all other terms in the sentence. I 
think, it construes an epistemic stand. Putnam believes 
that semantic holism is incompatible with a priority and 
he also thinks that the history of science proves that there 
is no property of sentences seem assure a sentence that 
will never need to be revised. Putnam does not accept the 
view that the meaning of every sentence/term is constitu-
tively connected with the meaning of all other 
terms/sentences that does not in itself state an epistemic 
position. He argues that the literal linguistic meaning that 
insists the sense of whatever a speaker supposes to know 
cannot be determined from any fixed sample of its uses. 
Putnam called this thesis simply ‘interpretation’ whereas 
Quine called it ‘radical translation’. Both of these do not 
deal with meaning. Actually, Quine denied the notion of 
constitutive connections of meanings. For him meaning is 
regarded as a second grade notion.30 
 Putnam thinks that there is a good sense in which we 
can claim that some of our beliefs are confirmed relative 
to our body of theories. However, he does not believe that 
Quine accepted ‘science-worthy’ sense of confirmation 
where the body of theory itself is confirmed by observa-
tion. Quine thinks that the propositional attitudes and 
mentalist terms that certainly include beliefs about mean-
ing are not ‘science-worthy’. When the meaning is not 
regarded as a ‘science-worthy’ notion for Quine, then, 
how can Quine possibly have a theory of meaning? I 
firmly admit with Putnam that for Quine, the notion of 
meaning has no place in serious scientific metaphysics. 
Even I chime in with Putnam that Quine considers ‘stimu-
lus meaning’ as a science-worthy notion identified with 
the observation conditionals which implied by a theory. 
But for Quine, these are regarded as a notion of ‘heuritic 
value’. The important thing is that we will find a puzzling 
line in Quine’s famous book The Roots of Reference31, 
where he claims that ‘To learn a language is to learn the 
meaning of its sentences, and hence to learn what obser-
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vation to count as evidence for and against them. The evi-
dence relation and the semantical relation of observation 
to the theory are co-extensive.’ For me, it sounds like 
meaning holism. But the problem that one will notice that 
(1) “the semantic relation” is not a relation of theoretical 
sentences to their referents (e.g. of sentences about elec-
trons to electrons, or sentences about genes to genes), 
which is what a philosopher of language would normally 
mean by a semantic relation, but only a relation of theo-
retical sentences to the observations that are connected to 
them by stimulus-response conditioning (which is no 
other philosopher would count as a “semantical” relations 
at all-here Quine is influenced by his friend Skinner’s be-
haviourist account of language); and (2) in the very next 
section, Quine says we should drop the talk of observa-
tions in favour of the talk of observation sentences! So we 
are left without a semantical relation to observations as 
well, because we have dropped observations. 
 Still a clue that I think mistakenly raised by some phi-
losophers is that Quine’s approach to semantic has two 
parts: a. Verificationism and b. Holism. These two theo-
ries are mingled with each other. I think that in his later 
writings, Quine extremely changed his mind and moved 
away himself from the boundary to admit the indetermi-
nacy of meaning and reference too. His translation 
manual leads him to accept the inter-subjective sameness 
of stimulus meaning in his naturalism. For him, the con-
cept of inter subjectivity can be regarded as a checkpoint 
that shows that the evidence should be available to the 
third person perspective. But some philosophers like 
Fodor, Lepore and Rosa called Quine a verificationist in a 
holistic sense where the whole theory presented to experi-
ence for validation. Fodor and Lepore think that the con-
firmation of an empirical theory doesn’t only depend on 
its relations to data, but also related to the other factors 
like availability of alternative theories, simplicity or plau-
sibility etc. That is Quine’s confirmation holism and they 
claim that the ‘Quine-Durkheim theses’ is the standard 
proof of their work. Fodor made a great mistake to con-
sider verification and confirmation as synonyms from an 
ordinary sense as I illustrated earlier that Quine did not. 
Quine is a meaning nihilist in the ontological sense as he 
clearly denies that there are such objects as meanings (and 
that sentences are not given meaning by links to objects 
like Propositions).  But to say that is not to say that words 
and sentences lack meaning because Quine already con-
sidered meaning as second grade notion.  I believe 
Quine’s view is that words and sentences have meaning, 
or are meaningful, but in a way that can be explained 
naturalistically and in a way that does not make us believe 
in meanings as mental entities.  The way that they are 
meaningful (through verification and confirmation, etc.) 
is a holistic way, thus meaning holism, because verifica-
tion and confirmation are holistic where the meaning of a 
sentence depends on the corporate body of the other sen-
tences and doubtlessly similar for a word. 
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